The core hypothesis of rent seeking: theoretical and empirical inconsistencie
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5433/2176-6665.2011v16n1p323Keywords:
Rent-seeking, Transfers, Waste, Economic liberalismAbstract
The expression rent seeking refers to the competitive appropriation of rents originated from the state intervention in the economy. Underlying this idea, is the assumption of full rent dissipation or, in other words, the presumption that state intervention could generate artificial rents and that the pursuit of these economic transfers by private agents could promote waste of productive resources similar to the original value of the rents created by the state action. Through this present article, the author intends to demonstrate that this scenario of total dissipation is an isolated occurrence, and not a general property inherent to state action. It is possible to conclude that the theory of rent seeking is incapable of producing general analytical results. Hence, there is clear fragility of political decisions when based in this theory.Downloads
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References
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HIGGINS, Richard S.; SHUGHART II, William F.; TOLLISON, Robert D. Free entry and efficient rent-seeking. Public choice, Dordrecht, v. 46, p. 247-258, 1985.
KRUEGER, Anne O. The political economy of the rent-seeking society, American Economic Review, Princeton, v. 64, p. 291-303, 1974.
POSNER, Richard A. The social costs of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, v. 83, p. 807-827, aug. 1975.
PINDYCK, Robert S.; RUBINFELD, Daniel L. Microeconomia. São Paulo: Makron Books, 1994.
TOLLISON, Robert D. Rent-Seeking: a survey. Kyklos, Basel, v. 35, p. 575-601, 1982.
TULLOCK, Gordon. Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: a comment. Public choice, Dordrecht, v. 43, p. 95-97, 1984.
TULLOCK, Gordon. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, Oxford, v. 5, p. 224-232, 1967.
TULLOCK, Gordon. Efficient rent seeking. In: BUCHANAN, James M.; TOLLISON, Robert D.; TULLOCK, Gordon (ed.). Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station: A & M University Press, p. 97-112, 1980.
TULLOCK, Gordon. The origin of Rent-Seeking concept. International Journal of Business and Economics, Arlington, v. 2, n. 1, p. 1-8. 2003.
CHUBB, John E. Interest groups and the bureaucracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983.
CORCORAN, William J. Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rentseeking. Public choice, Dordrecht, v. 43, p. 89-94, 1984.
DOUGAN, William R.; SNYDER, James M. Are rents fully dissipated. Public choice, Dordrecht, v. 77, n. 4, p. 793-813, 1992.
FIANI, Ronaldo. Uma avaliação crítica da teoria de rent seeking. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2003. (Série Seminário de Pesquisa).
HIGGINS, Richard S.; SHUGHART II, William F.; TOLLISON, Robert D. Free entry and efficient rent-seeking. Public choice, Dordrecht, v. 46, p. 247-258, 1985.
KRUEGER, Anne O. The political economy of the rent-seeking society, American Economic Review, Princeton, v. 64, p. 291-303, 1974.
POSNER, Richard A. The social costs of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago, v. 83, p. 807-827, aug. 1975.
PINDYCK, Robert S.; RUBINFELD, Daniel L. Microeconomia. São Paulo: Makron Books, 1994.
TOLLISON, Robert D. Rent-Seeking: a survey. Kyklos, Basel, v. 35, p. 575-601, 1982.
TULLOCK, Gordon. Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: a comment. Public choice, Dordrecht, v. 43, p. 95-97, 1984.
TULLOCK, Gordon. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, Oxford, v. 5, p. 224-232, 1967.
TULLOCK, Gordon. Efficient rent seeking. In: BUCHANAN, James M.; TOLLISON, Robert D.; TULLOCK, Gordon (ed.). Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station: A & M University Press, p. 97-112, 1980.
TULLOCK, Gordon. The origin of Rent-Seeking concept. International Journal of Business and Economics, Arlington, v. 2, n. 1, p. 1-8. 2003.
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Published
2011-03-13
How to Cite
FERRARI, Vinícius Eduardo. The core hypothesis of rent seeking: theoretical and empirical inconsistencie. Mediações - Revista de Ciências Sociais, Londrina, v. 16, n. 1, p. 323–344, 2011. DOI: 10.5433/2176-6665.2011v16n1p323. Disponível em: https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/mediacoes/article/view/9663. Acesso em: 2 jan. 2025.
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