REINTERPRETATION OF THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE MERIT

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to portray that, despite the theory of separation of powers being enshrined in the Brazoçoam Federal Constitution as a fundamental principle, the current scenario reveals that the Judiciary has increasingly encroached upon the typical functions of other branches, particularly the discretionary acts of the Executive. This judicial intervention, manifested through judicial review of administrative decisions, underscores significant judicial activism, leading to a cautious approach by administrators who fear decisions being challenged in court. In response to this trend, doctrinal positions advocating judicial self-restraint and deference to Public Administration have emerged from a contemporary interpretation of the separation of powers. Through a qualitative analysis of doctrinal viewpoints and employing a hypothetical-deductive approach, the study concludes that, as the Judiciary is the final arbiter, a critical self-reflection promoting self-restraint and respect for Public Administration, in accordance with the separation of powers, could mitigate the current trend of excessive judicial intervention in administrative matters, thereby preventing mere judicial substitution of administrative discretion.