Animais como pessoas e “dignidade animal”

Abstract

This paper aims to examine some questions raised by the recent use of the term “animal dignity”. The attribution of an intrinsic value to animals, including by constitutionalists and bioethicists, cannot be seen as a mere extension of the notion of human dignity, because it involves (or should involve) a rethinking of the philosophical concept of person and the ideas of social contract and justice. The easy and unthinking acceptance of this alleged dignity leave unanswered many practical issues and have a double risk: not find the appropriate basis for the protection of animals and weakens the reasons why the human person is considered, in opposition to everything, an end in itself. Furthermore, “person” is not merely descriptive concept, but an axiological acquisition. Personhood is an ethical category that arises not from approximations of capabilities, but of a reciprocal recognition by beings of equal value. Although animals have value, are not recognized as having the same value, a fact that excludes them from the idea of law, represented by the Hegelian imperative or commandment of right: “Be a person and respect others as persons”.