The intensity of the executive branch’s interference in brazilian legislative activities: delimitating the legislative proposals in president Dilma Vana Rousseff´s first year of her second term in office.

Abstract

The rule of law and the current and former constitutions amplified federal functions and allowed for a more active participation of the executive branch in the Brazilian legislative process. Nonetheless, this paper investigates whether the legislative branch contributes to the increasing intensity of the executive branch´s participation and questions if, in this context, the chief of state can ignore the constitutional principle of the threefold division of power. Fortunately, answering these questions led to the hypothesis, which in the end was confirmed, that the legislative branch not only acts calmly with a president´s interference but also instigates this process. Furthermore, this process only acts to reduce the executive power´s functional autonomy without infringing the principle of separation of powers and with that said, this study examines these various questions with the bibliography method, specific norms and data compilations from official and government websites with the aim of determining the intensity of these problems.