A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5433/1980-511X.2018v13n3p41

Keywords:

Competition, Cartels, Lenience agreements, Markers, One-stop shop.

Abstract

This study, as a whole, assumes the social benefits of market competition, where unethical behavior, such as illegal agreements between market competitors (i.e. cartels), causes problems for the global system of free markets. Because of this socially undesirable conduct, countries have different leniency programs, which idealize solutions that are gaining strength in the fight against cartels worldwide. Moreover, this paper explores the logic behind leniency agreements in the elaboration of amnesty agreements. Furthermore, this study tackles another fundamental problem: the excess of jurisdictions in leniency agreements – which, at the global level, restricts the global system of free market defense. With this problem in mind, this research proposes a solution for the excess of jurisdictions and investigates another approach: a proposal of a "one-stop shop for the first bells", that is, a global system of distribution of unified passwords for leniency agreements that may involve a number of countries.

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Author Biographies

Dany Rafael Fonseca Mendes, University Center of Brasília – UniCEUB

Master

Michel Constantino, Dom Bosco Catholic University – UCDB

Doctorate

Gabriel Paes Herrera, Dom Bosco Catholic University – UCDB

Master

Published

2018-12-23

How to Cite

Mendes, D. R. F., Constantino, M., & Herrera, G. P. (2018). A single balcony for those who ’first touch the bell’ in global lenience agreements. Revista Do Direito Público, 13(3), 41–55. https://doi.org/10.5433/1980-511X.2018v13n3p41

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Section

Artigos