

Implicit Text Messages and Countermeanings Conceptual Designs

Roberta Maria Garcia **BLASQUE***
Esther Gomes de **OLIVEIRA****

* PhD (2015) in Language Studies at the Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL). Post-doctoral student at UEL. Contact: robertamgblasque@gmail.com.

** PhD (2000) in Linguistics at the Universidade de São Paulo (2000). Associate Professor C at UEL. Contact: ego@uel.br.

Abstract:

In this study, whose theoretical foundation is Argumentative Semantics, we research the implicit contents proposed by Oswald Ducrot, presuppositions and presumptions, since the meanings and the countermeanings are configured in the said and unsaid of the enunciated. We discuss the concepts and the performance of the presuppositions and presumptions, mentioning authors who are also based on Ducrot's contributions. We consider presupposition a mechanism inscribed in the language itself, and the resulting implicit movements act, consequently, as strong argumentative elements. This study intermediates a contact with the text's implicit messages, contributing to the anchoring of the countermeaning to Argumentative Semantics and, consequently, its conceptual design, as a non-linear content to the text extension, whose examination demonstrates, in a veiled way, an idea different from the meaning previously linked to the enunciated. We illustrate the movements of the meanings and the countermeanings by means of advertising pieces that promote rejuvenating cosmetics, in order to show different stances – hiding the age (advertising) and accepting the age (Gerontology) – which provide a solid basis for the emergence of the countermeaning as a semantic phenomenon. We note the complementarity between meanings and countermeanings, which function as an implicit argumentative strategy and transmit effects of meaning.

Keywords:

Argumentative Semantics. Implicit messages. Countermeaning.

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*The argument is sustained both
by what it says in all letters and by what it leads to understand.*
(AMOSSY, 2018, p. 178).

INTRODUCTION

According to Gerontology, the elderly must necessarily accept their limitations and chronological age, with no desire to return to previous stages of the life cycle, in order to reach an active and prosperous old age. Assuming a different conception, the media disseminates advertisements for rejuvenating cosmetics and, in its speech, transmits feelings of fear and aversion towards old age. In this context, we find different ideological attitudes: the acceptance of age (Gerontology) and the concealment of age (advertising), subsidizing the emergence of the countermeaning, that is, these advertising pieces started to function, according to this observation, as countermeanings of the gerontological discourse and *vice versa*.

Thus, we join countermeaning to Argumentative Semantic, associating it to the implicit information of the text. In addition to being present in the ads as a whole, we found that the countermeaning was present within its constitution, that is, meanings and countermeanings structured, in an argumentative way, the advertising text. From this, we added to our research the notion of interaction and complementarity, considering that the ideological differences between advertising and Gerontology dialogue with each other and, together, build the persuasion of the advertisement, transmitting effects of meaning and certain values.

Our objective is to present and disseminate the conceptual design of the countermeaning as an implicit semantic phenomenon, showing that, in several research *corpora*, it is possible for the countermeaning to manifest itself as an implicit argumentative strategy and transmit meaning effects, there must just be an idea different from the meaning previously linked to the enunciated. Consequently, the ideological interaction situated in the text's implicit information will be noticeable, through meanings, countermeanings and argumentative strategies. The contrast, coming from the countermeanings, provides an argumentative analysis and attribution of meanings, with significant contributions to knowing the possibilities of the language.

Our research correlates the countermeaning to Argumentative Semantics, demonstrating it on advertising speech for seniors. Nonetheless, this phenomenon, as mentioned above, can arise in different *corpora*, being unlimited source of study. In this paper, we will not present more specific analysis of advertising pieces, because our intentions are to expose the concept of countermeaning showing its anchoring to Argumentative Semantics, and just tell it was discovered from the ideological differences between Gerontology and advertising. In this way, we researched the implicit contents proposed by Oswald Ducrot, presuppositions and presumptions, since the meanings and the countermeanings are configured in said and unsaid of the enunciated. We discuss presuppositions and presumptions concepts and performance, quoting authors who are also based on Ducrot's contributions.

ARGUMENTATIVE SEMANTICS

In the late 1970's and early 1980's, one of the main objectives of language studies, due to the Linguistics of Enunciation, was argumentation. For Oliveira (2004, p. 122), "the mechanisms that interact within the discursive reality, taking into account the cognitive and informative aspects of language, provide a vast field of research, being responsible for a multiplicity of argumentative theories". Thus, the course of argumentative research, from Antiquity to the 20th century, favored the emergence of a new semantic theory, concerned with the analysis of the enunciated, providing another focus to the studies of meaning.

Argumentative Semantics emerged in France, with Oswald Ducrot and Jean-Claude Anscombre, with the publication, in 1976, in *Langages* journal, of the paper entitled "L'argumentation dans la langue", and it is based on the theory that argumentation is inscribed in the language itself. The article presents this new semantic theory, considered one of the aspects of Pragmatics, as a study of the relationships between the interlocutors in a discourse situation. According to Guimarães (1997, p. 147-148), Ducrot's fundamental idea shows that the argumentative value of a sentence is not only the consequence of the information released, but also the persuasive effects achieved by certain expressions, serving to provide an argumentative orientation to the enunciated and lead the recipient to specific directions.

According to Barbisan (2013, p. 20), "From a semantic point of view, the Theory of Argumentation in Language postulates that the word contains, in the language, a meaning that allows certain continuations in the enunciated and prevents others". It is not enough to just deliver information/content, that is, the enunciated is not defined in itself, because when an announcer produces a speech, launching something he believes in, he expects a response, a reaction. The meaning of the enunciated is in the interaction that is established between individuals, in the act of communication, at an argumentative level, guiding the other to a certain conclusion. For the author, "the argument becomes fundamental in language. It is inscribed in the language, to which it is inherent, it is in the very nature of the language. This is the reason why Argumentative Semantics is also called Theory of Argumentation in Language" (p. 21).

For Ducrot (1977), the intersubjective relations inherent to speech are not reduced to communication, that is, there is not only the exchange of knowledge, but, on the contrary, there is a great variety of inter-human relations, for which the language offers not just the occasion and the environment but also an institutional framework with rules. Thus, "The language, then, is no longer just the place where individuals meet; it also imposes, in this encounter, very determined forms [...]. it loses its innocence" (p. 12). According to the author, we must consider the language as a game, or better, as the establishment of the rules of a game, and not only as a communication tool. Oliveira (1999) highlights: "Language, in Ducrot's semantic theory, is not only used for the communicative function, but plays the role of revealing, of transmitting thought" (p. 55).

Language is an essentially dialogical form of action and a social instrument that proposes to act on the behavior of others, leading speakers to share their judgments. Thus, Argumentative Semantics, based on locutor-alocutor relationship, by setting the dialogical perspective, supports the game of interpersonal relations caught between interlocutors in language use. And, according to Barbisan (2013, p. 23),

the exercise of language is between two speaking beings: the speaker and the addressee. When enunciating, by speaking or writing, the speaker produces his own combinations, among those that the sentence allows. In other words, the speaker argues about reality when establishing continuations, which indicates, once again, that the meaning thus produced is not representative of reality. It is the speaker, when choosing linguistic combinations, who attributes meanings to reality. It is their 'look' at reality. This meaning, understood in this way, awaits a continuation, a response from the addressee. Thus, we have, once again, Plato's otherness, so well understood by Saussure, now seen at the level of the enunciated.

Koch (1984) continues in Ducrot's postulates when stating that the act of arguing, of orienting the discourse towards certain conclusions, constitutes the fundamental linguistic act, since the communicative exchange between individuals is characterized by intentionality and constant choices words or other strategies that, when transmitting purposeful meaning effects, influence the performance of the other. Thus, for the researcher, "Neutrality is just a myth: the discourse that is intended to be 'neutral', naive, also contains an ideology – that of their own objectivity" (p. 17).

By adopting argumentation as a constitutive factor in the structure of each and every discourse, and conveying ideology, Argumentative Semantics can fill the space left by text grammars, so one must consider the argumentative orientation of a text's enunciated as a cohesion factor and, mainly, textual coherence.

For Koch (1984), the macro-syntax of discourse constitutes the object of Argumentative Semantics, and it is at this level, and not on the surface of the text, that a series of persuasive marks loaded with ideology is found. Among the linguistic marks of the argument, Koch (p. 33) highlights the following: the presuppositions; the marks of intentions, explicit or veiled; the modalizers, which reveal an attitude towards the enunciated produced; argumentative operators, responsible for the chain of the enunciated; and the reciprocal images, which are established between the interlocutors and the masks assumed by them in the play of representations.

According to Barbisan (2013), the search for an explanation of meaning, in the use of language, through Argumentative Semantics, initially had two forms. The first one, the "*standard*" form, initial; the second one added the notion of polyphony to the first; and the last one, currently developed by Oswald Ducrot and Marion Carel, is called the Theory of Semantic Blocks, in which two discourses evoked by a linguistic entity and articulated by a connector, *therefore* or *nevertheless*, are called argumentative chains. Finally, we emphasize the essential principles of Argumentative Semantics – argumentation is inscribed within language itself; communication has an interactional and intentional function; language is constructed by means of argumentative devices that direct the other towards specific purposes – in order, in this way, to analyze the implicit information of the text (the said and the unsaid) and to reach the countermeaning adhesion to the Argumentative Semantics.

SAID AND UNSAID / PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS

Often, an enunciated, in the spoken or written language, allows interpretations that go beyond the sequence of marks present on the surface of the text, that is, there is information beyond what is explicitly said by the apparent signs. The enunciated "it is hot" can only mean "it is hot", however, in certain scenarios, this statement has other meanings, such as: "open the window", "turn off the heater", "can I take off my coat?", "I don't have anything more interesting to say". Thus, most of the enunciated have, in addition to their explicit content, one or more implicit contents, which are not predicted based solely on the literal meaning, as they go beyond what is said.

In order to understand the possible meanings in a language, we also need to unravel the implicit messages and examine the reasons for the permanence of certain unsaid between the lines of the discourse. According to Ilari (2001, p. 92),

Very important for the final interpretation of the message, these implicit ones can only be discovered by conjectural work based on a global assessment of the communicative situation, in which the listener seeks to recover the speaker's intentions. Messages that carry this type of implicit are always interpreted as 'indirect' and typically oblige the listener to ask: 'What did he mean by that?', 'What did he mean?' etc.

Thus, in order to perform an efficient reading, the reader must pay attention to the explicit and implicit meanings of the text, because, if they are not perceptive, they will fail to prioritize, or will not reach,

essential meanings. The calculation of the implicit is a problematic procedure, often leading to erroneous results: the implicit information is not perceived or is not properly interpreted, causing misunderstandings. To exemplify, in a simple way, the operation of the implicit, the phrase “The weather continues rainy” explicitly communicates that the weather is rainy at the time of speech, but at the same time, the verb “continue” lets us understand the implicit information that the weather had been rainy before.

In addition to this example, we find, in our daily lives, more complex enunciated, mainly in the political or advertising sphere, which, without the proper interpretations of the implicit, can generate negative consequences and harm a person’s public image or the effectiveness of a product. On the other hand, some types of text explore, with malice or fallacious intentions, the implicit contents, using them purposefully, as a strategy, for the benefit of their own goals. According to Ferrarezi Junior (2008, p. 176), “advertising is a very conducive environment to give implicit messages. We read an advertisement and soon we feel obliged to buy things”.

According to Ilari (2001, p. 84),

the information conveyed by the linguistic messages has different degrees of explicitness. All information that a sentence conveys can be considered implicit, without the speaker explicitly committing himself to their truth. This information then needs to be ‘inferred’ from the sentence through some reasoning that starts from the sentence itself.

Implicit forms are generally used at times when it is not appropriate to say everything openly, when we need to say it and, at the same time, act as if we have not said it, refusing the responsibility for any comment. Cabral (2011) quotes some reasons that justify the use of implicit forms: the existence of an impediment in relation to certain information, the fear of offending the interlocutor or of generating an embarrassment, the allusion to a restricted subject within the community in which we participate, among other reasons. For the author, we can avoid a confrontation if we use ways of saying that they do not expose the content said to the contestation, leaving, in these situations, some implicit positioning. That way, “the implicit forms fulfill the function of saying what we want to say without being obliged to assume that we have said” (CABRAL, 2011, p. 60).

For Guimarães (2009), the use of the implicit provides a suggestion or accusation, without directly involving the enunciator of the message. Thus, “we use the implicit so that we can construct the possible meanings of the **unsaid**, the **prohibited**, the **subtext**, the **subjectivity**” (p. 62). The different meanings of the enunciated, present in the implicit, are subordinate to the context in which the enunciated is produced and the intention with which it was formulated. Often, the perception of implicit depends on the socio-institutional context, on the mutual knowledge of the interlocutors, on their shared knowledge and on their relationships.

According to Charaudeau and Maingueneau (2004), semantic and pragmatic literature mentions a variety of implicit contents, such as inferences, implications and implicatures, allusions and insinuations, irony, among others. Of the most relevant distinctions, the authors cite the one established by Oswald Ducrot, between presupposition and presumption, two types of implicit content that are opposed to the explicit content, or posed. In addition, some implicit messages are marked, having, in the enunciated, a lexical or morphosyntactic support, while others are not, or are less clearly.

The implicit contents that do not have an explicit mark in the enunciated, more frequent case, can be identified based on other factors, in contextual principles, such as a certain encyclopedic knowledge. Thus, “The interpretive work consists, therefore, in combining the information extracted from the enunciated with certain contextual data, [...], to build a coherent and credible semantic-pragmatic representation of the enunciated” (CHARAUDEAU; MAINGUENEAU, 2004, p. 271).

For Cabral (2011), the implicit procedures are divided into two categories: discursive and non-discursive. The discursive ones depend on the context of enunciation and on the reasoning of the interlocutor to be reconstructed; they are formed by the presumptions. Non-discursive procedures are inscribed in the meaning of the elements that make up the enunciated and are constituted by the presuppositions. Thus, the presumption is not inscribed in the enunciated, as it depends on the interlocutor's reasoning around the enunciated and, many times, we say one thing to make another understand. The presupposition, on the contrary, does not depend only on the interlocutor's reasoning, since they are inscribed in the language, in the meaning of the phrases that make up the enunciated in which they find themselves. An enunciated that contains a presupposition always comprises a given content and another presupposition. We see the example proposed by Cabral (p. 63):

- enunciated: Paulo quit smoking;
- posed: Paulo does not smoke;
- presupposition: Paulo smoked before;
- presumption: the statement can act as a warning to an interlocutor who smokes a lot and has Paulo as an example to follow.

According to the author, the verbal expression “quit” plus the verb “smoke” denies Paul's act of smoking and presupposes the practice of this conduct prior to the moment of enunciation. Furthermore, if we say “Paulo quit smoking” to someone who smokes a lot and has Paulo as an example, she/he can understand the statement as an indirect message, based on the idea that he should also quit smoking. This message is left only in the presumption and the interlocutor may or may not understand the advice as a warning.

Maingueneau (1996) explains that the interlocutors are able to capture a large portion of the presumptions, based on the enunciation situation, but the presupposition, another great type of implicit content, is inscribed in the structure of the enunciated, regardless of their employment contexts. The author presents the following example:

- A: I'm looking for someone to fix my car;
- B: my brother is at home;
- A: but he is always so busy!

Based on B's reply, we infer the presupposition “B has a brother”, configuring an implicit information inscribed in the enunciated itself. In addition, we can extract from B's reply another implicit content : B proposes to A that his brother can fix the car. However, this meaning is not inferred by A from the literal value of the reply is not recorded in the enunciated, but by a kind of reasoning, featuring the presumption. Putting ourselves in the position of A, we find the following sequence of thoughts: B tells me that his brother is at home; I can assume that he speaks properly, therefore his enunciated is related to what I have just said; certainly, B intends to tell me, with that, that his brother would be able to make this repair.

According to Maingueneau (1996), the existence of the presumption is always uncertain and that of the presupposition is always stable. In this way, “any speaker who knows Portuguese can, in principle, identify the presuppositions, while the deciphering of the presumption is more random. Furthermore, the number of these presumptions is open by definition” (p. 93). The construction of inferences is a hard and complex work, because, alongside the presuppositions, there are much more unstable sectors, the presumptions, determining both the most guaranteed and the most uncertain meanings. In another work, Maingueneau (2001, p. 22) takes up this versatility of the presumption and states that “in linguistic communication, it often happens that we do not know whether the enunciated should be taken literally or not, if it is ironic or if it is a joke”.

In addition, the treatment of the implicit is ambiguous, as there is both a refusal of frankness and a mark of delicacy, both an unwillingness to live together and an extreme will to live together. Even if the implicit is used without skill, it can be even more offensive than explicit sincerity. For Maingueneau (1996, p. 95), “As the implicit is defined as a game between what is said and what is unsaid, a game at the border, it is normal for it to pass continuously from one side to the other”.

Regarding presuppositions, Maingueneau defines them as an inference inscribed in the enunciated itself, regardless of the variety of its possible enunciative contexts. From this, the author proposes a distinction between two levels of content of an enunciated: a level of foreground, corresponding to what the enunciated refers to – the posed; and a level in the background, on which the posed is based – the presupposition. Corroborating Maingueneau’s (1996) explanation, Fiorin (2014) states that “the explicit content will be called ‘posed’, while the implicit content triggered by the formulation of the enunciated, regardless of the enunciation situation, will be called ‘presupposition’” (p. 23).

When it comes to its relationship with textuality, the presupposition plays a fundamental role in the construction of textual coherence, because, in order to progress, a text is based on information that is later converted into an presupposition. Without this information, there would be only a series of enunciated without links or an indefinite repetition of the same fact. For this reason, presuppositions are constructed prior to the enunciated (MAINGUENEAU, 1996).

According to Charaudeau and Maingueneau (2004), the presuppositions (shared evidence) constitute a type of base on which posed information is formulated (new information), guaranteeing the cohesion of the discourse, when the posed ones are in charge of its progression. And, for Maingueneau (1996), classically, there are two types of presuppositions, local and global. The first one consists of an inclusion, for example, “When did you arrive?” presupposes “someone has arrived at a certain moment”. The second ones are based on an advance, for example, “Paulo is no longer here” presupposes “Paulo was here before” and “there is an individual named Paulo”, whose addressee, supposedly, is able to identify. The local presupposition needs a partial interrogation (Who? Where? When?), which concerns the constituents of the sentence, and the global one intervenes negation or total interrogation, which refer to the sentence as a whole.

Comparing the implicit contents, Maingueneau (1996, p. 105) states:

Presuppositions and presumptions allow speakers to say without saying, advance content without completely assuming their responsibility. In the case of the presupposition, there is a retreat from that content; in the case of the presumption, it is rather a kind of divination posed to the co-enunciator. It must derive from propositions based on the general principles that govern the use of language. These presumptions are, therefore, not predictable out of context; according to the contexts, the same sentence may give rise to totally different presumptions.

Regarding this lack of responsibility for what is said, Fiorin (2014) adds that, in the case of the presumption, the enunciator manages to hide behind the literal meaning of the sentence, to deny its real message. He does not commit himself and, if necessary, he can contest that he said what the listener understood from his words, as a form of self-protection. The presumption does not say, it just suggests, acting as unmarked insinuations on the surface of the text, that is, they are not encoded in the lexical and syntactic components.

The presupposition is indisputable information, the enunciator’s responsibility, and the presumption is the enunciatee’s responsibility, whose information must be updated according to the communicative situation. The presupposition designates what can be logically implied by the posed, it is not explicitly present in the message, but it is inscribed in the enunciated. The presumption, on the other hand, is context-dependent and linked to the enunciation; some items, such as a gesture, a wink, a hesitation are necessary for his imprisonment.

To understand this process of disengagement that occurs with the manipulation of the presumptions, we see an example of Fiorin (2014): the opponent of a certain candidate for a political position ran an

advertisement in which an announcer asked “Do you even know who this candidate is?”, “Do you know where he came from?”, “What is the history of his party?”. Then, the candidate’s photo appeared, and the announcer asked: “Do you know if he is married?”, “Does he have children?”. In this case, the presumption was in the candidate’s sexual option, as the opponent implied that he was homosexual, even without explicitly saying this content. Thus, the responsibility for that information lies with the public.

According to Ducrot (1987), the real object of study of a semanticist is the different occurrences of an enunciated in different situations, as the semantic description is an extremely heterogeneous set. Thus, in addition to linguistic knowledge, we must consider a number of psychological, logical and sociological codes, that is, information regarding the various uses of language in a community. Prioritizing the different contexts in which the same enunciated is said, we discover several meanings. From this perspective, Ducrot defends a semantics that goes beyond the enunciated, surpassing a purely linguistic semantic description and based on the fact that any sentence has infinite meanings.

To account for the infinity of meanings arising from various possible contexts, Ducrot breaks down the semantic description of an enunciated into two main compartments:

- linguistic component – assigns to each enunciated an exclusively linguistic meaning, without considering the context. For example, to A corresponds to the meaning A’;
- rhetorical component – produces the meaning of the enunciated in face of contextual circumstances. For example, it would be up to this second component, considering the meaning A’ linked to A and the circumstances X in which A is produced, to predict the effective meaning of A in situation X.

In search of a better understanding of the previous components, the author distinguishes two types of meaning effects, the presupposition and the presumption, describing one of them from the linguistic component, while the other requires the intervention of the rhetorical component. As Ducrot (1987), one of the first criteria that makes it possible to differentiate presuppositions and presumptions derives from the very particular behavior assumed by the presuppositions by keep up affirmed even being subjected to syntactic changes, such as negation, question and subordination.

For example, if the enunciated “João smoked in the old days” is changed to “does João still smoke?” (questions) or “João does not continue smoking” (denial) or “João continues to smoke, even though the doctor forbade him to smoke” (subordination), his central information, “João was a smoker”, will be maintained. This particular behavior in the face of denial, question and subordination characterizes the presuppositions, whose marks are inscribed in the enunciated. The tendency of the presupposition is to always resist syntactic changes, because, even modified, they bring messages that are always affirmed. The presupposition is a meaning relation in which, when someone says “X”, he assumes “Y”, and, when someone says “not X”, he continues to assume “Y” in the same way. However, tests of syntactic changes do not work in the case of the presumptions.

From these examples, Ducrot (1987) verifies a distinction between the level of the enunciated, in which the posed and the presupposition correspond to the linguistic component (it is the enunciated itself, without considering its conditions of occurrence), and the presumption (absent from the enunciated, without considering the conditions of occurrence, the context), to the rhetorical component. For the author,

the phenomenon of presupposition seems to be in close relationship with the general syntactic structures – which provides a first reason to treat it in the linguistic component where, evidently, the semantic value of these constructions should be described. The same argument cannot be used, in the case of presumptions, since the relationship with the syntax is much more difficult to appear. [...] there is always for an enunciated with presumptions, a “literal meaning” from which such presumptions are excluded. They seem to have been added (DUCROT, 1987, p. 19).

Based on Ducrot (p. 20-21), we elaborated the following table for a better visualization of the notions that comprise the post, the presupposition and the presumption:

Chart 1 – The posed, the presupposition and the presumption in the experience of communication

	Posed	Presupposition	Presumption
As an announcer	That's what I say. Presented as evidence, as an indisputable statement within which the conversation must subscribe.	It is what I present as belonging to the common domain of the two characters in the dialogue, as the object of a fundamental complicity that links the participants in the act of communication among themselves.	This is what I let my listener conclude, based on the circumstances of the enunciated.
Regarding the pronoun system	Posed It is claimed by the "I".	Presupposition It is presented as belonging to the "we", comprising sender and receiver.	Understated It is passed on to the "you", in the conclusions he draws from the enunciated at his own risk.
According to temporal images	Posed It presents itself simultaneously to the act of communication, as if it had appeared for the first time, in the universe of discourse, at the moment of the realization of this act.	Presupposition Even though it has never been introduced before to the act of enunciation, it seeks to situate itself in a past of the knowledge to which the speaker seems to refer.	Understated It occurs after this act, as if it had been added through the listener's interpretation.

Source: Prepared by the authors, based on Ducrot (1987, p. 20-21).

In this way, the post and the presupposition are presented as contributions inscribed in the language (they are not linked to an individual reflection of the speakers), as if they had been chosen concomitantly, and then apply the responsibility to the speaker, even if, in the case of the presupposition, the speaker tries to share this responsibility with the listener, disguising what he says under the guise of a common belief (DUCROT, 1987). In the case of the presumption, the listener must discover it by means of a discursive procedure, of a kind of reasoning, refuting the literal meaning, based both on the enunciation and on the content said. According to Ducrot (1987, p. 22), "the enunciated is used at a specific time in specific circumstances. The listener's reasoning could then be made explicit by a formula like: if someone thinks it is appropriate to tell me that, it is, without a doubt, because he thinks that".

Ducrot does not consider the distinctions between presupposition and presumption as opposing concepts; he just verifies that the notions of these implicit contents are not situated at the same level. For him, "the presupposition is an integral part of the meaning of the enunciated. The presumption, in turn, concerns the way in which this meaning must be deciphered by the addressee" (p. 41). The speaker presents his speech as an enigma for the addressee to solve. Thus, "It is this process that illustrates the presumption: to say something, the other is made to say what was said" (p. 43).


According to Koch (1984), the common point between both refers to the possibility given, in both cases, to the speaker to portray himself; this is possible, even on the presupposition, because the assumed information is placed outside the discourse, so that the speaker cannot be attacked for his purpose, since the later discourse, the dialogue expected and offered by the enunciated bearing the presupposition, cannot fall on him. In the case of the presumption, the speaker presents his speech as an enigma and it is up to the addressee to solve it, acquiring full responsibility for the assimilated meanings.

The presupposition is one of the basic notions of all Oswald Ducrot's work, however, from the early works of the author, it has come a long way, suffering a series of reformulations. In the work *Argumentation and language*, Koch (1984, p. 55-70) provides a detailed discussion of the many changes around the presuppositions and presumptions, basing on various Ducrot's papers. In his own book, Ducrot (1987, p. 31-43) even writes a chapter dedicated to a review of these mechanisms, mainly justifying the displacement of the opposition previously established between the two terms.

Charaudeau and Maingueneau (2004) state that the various properties of implicit content are the subject of great debates among linguists, as there are problems involving the different ways of manipulating presuppositions and the diversity of their behavior in some cases. However, there is a consensus, on the part of the researchers, regarding one factor: "the presuppositions always have, unlike the presumptions, a *marker* in the enunciated, which gives them a relative independence in relation to the context" (p. 405).

MEANING, NONSENSE AND ARGUMENTATION

We reflect about Argumentative Semantics and implicit information of the text to support the interweaving of the terms *meaning* and *countermeaning* in our theoretical basis. The study of presuppositions and presumptions intermediated a contact with the non-explicit messages of the text, providing our immersion in another space, formed by abstract contents, which demand a detailed and more attentive interpretation, and which can generate different meanings. From this perspective, we prepared the following script, whose positioning of the terms clarifies the adherence of the countermeaning to our research:



The said and unsaid of the texts contribute to the formation of different meanings, varying according to the intentions of the speaker. When sent to individuals, these meanings or said do not cause a fixed and predicted assimilation, that is, reactions differ according to the context. Thus, if there is a specific objective in the dissemination of certain meanings, the text producer must strategically plan the linguistic resources and the possible implicit messages related to them, in order to obtain the desired results. From this perspective, the movement of implicit in the texts is a highly argumentative phenomenon. Once messages are disseminated and absorbed in different ways, even if they are very well designed for certain purposes, they can have pleasant,

neutral or uncomfortable effects, often contradicting the individual or larger groups, including institutions or areas of study, which present different beliefs to the ideas, to the meanings transmitted in some way.

In these circumstances, we find, in addition to the meanings, another implicit semantic phenomenon, the *countermeaning*. It is a non-linear content outside the text, the examination of which reveals, in a veiled way, a different idea from the meaning previously linked to the enunciated. For Contani and Oliveira (2014, p. 113), “Countermeanings are defined as the tendency of a word or expression, phrase or text, act of speaking or listening to be prone to evoke reactions that can be both divergent and complementary, but they are always cooperative”.

For Oléron (1996), contradiction is a social reality and manifests itself when exchanges between people take on a polemical form, in which affirmation and denial are opposed to the same content. The understanding of contradiction is related to the properties manifested by objects, actions, people and words. Affirming and denying are social, positioning or rejection behaviors. The existence of a said message and an unsaid message may (or may not) provoke the opposite. From this, we understand that the said will always be the manifestation of a meaning, regardless of the results of its various interpretations. The information present in the countermeaning will always be a content that diverges from a previous meaning, and can complement it.

In a scenario of contrasting interpretations, the countermeaning appears. In addition, the advertising discourse itself, a genre of our interest for these analyzes, conveys other countermeanings, which interact with the main meanings, and both structure the argumentation of the text. The advertisement, as a whole, is configured in a countermeaning, when compared to a discourse different from what it conveys, and may also present other countermeanings within it. Based on Argumentative Semantics, implicit messages and more specifically in advertising discourse, we formulate the following definition:

Chart 2 – Conceptual design of the countermeaning

COUNTERMEANING
Semantic phenomenon that reveals a different idea from the meaning previously linked to the enunciated. Countermeanings, within advertisements, are contents that “denounce”, through veiled meaning effects, an ideology different from that of the dominant discourse.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

It is not enough to differentiate between any content that seems to diverge and to name the implicit information as countermeaning; the study of meaning and countermeaning demands research and consistency. Thus, in order to recognize a countermeaning, it is necessary to carefully investigate the principles that generate the differentiation between the two messages to be analyzed, always considering some essential questions, such as:

- Why is there a contrast?
- How does it work?
- Why are different meanings being disseminated? With what intentions?
- Is there credibility and reliability in the dimensions that spread these different messages?
- Do these messages reach the interlocutor significantly?
- Socially, what are the consequences of disclosing these different meanings?

- Is contrast research relevant?
- Are the implicit movements, resulting from the contrast, argumentative?

In our research, we correlated countermeaning and Argumentative Semantics, as this resource comes from the study of implicit processes and also functions as an argumentative strategy. Depending on the use of implicit messages, leading to meanings and countermeaning, the interlocutor can activate previous knowledge, in his mind, and present a total rejection of what is being enunciated or, on the contrary, is in line with the propagated ideas. “The difference in understanding these domains produces the countermeaning” (CONTANI; OLIVEIRA, 2014, p. 112). As a result, the use of this resource must be planned, argumentatively, so as not to present communication failures and not generate inappropriate interpretations to the objective intended by the speaker. On this argumentative issue of implicit messages, Fiorin states (2014, p. 23):

A text says more than what is on the surface, because it not only transmits explicit content, but also implicit content, marked in the enunciated or in the communication situation, which we learn when making inferences. Implicit content can be presuppositions and presumptions. The explicit content will be called ‘posed’, while the implicit content triggered by the formulation of the enunciated, regardless of the situation of the enunciated, will be called ‘presupposition’. [...] **The use of presupposition is a strong argumentative resource, since it leads to accepting certain ideas from the enunciator** (without emphasis in the original).

Transporting the meanings and the countermeanings to the universe of advertising discourse, the argumentative creation of the implicit messages must be elaborated, meticulously, so as not to alleviate, in the reader/consumer, the need, the desire to buy the product mentioned. For example, in advertisements that promote rejuvenating cosmetics and establish the idea of hiding old age, the meanings emanating from the ad’s text and image must follow this ideology and criticize aging, highlighting the beauty and advantages of youth, presenting it as a goal to be pursued.

If this discourse implicitly reveals some indication of gains and advantages in old age, the reader/consumer can interrupt their mental process about the “wonders of youth” and, analyzing the situation better, reduce their enthusiasm for cosmetics. Thus, there would be no consistent reasons for purchasing the product, due to persuasive flaws in the operation of implicit. In these advertisements, the countermeaning from the science of old age, gerontology, accepting old age, must remain veiled, and the advertiser must pay attention to the fact that no trace, linguistic or not, directs their audience’s thinking to another ideology.

However, we verified that the countermeanings, in this type of advertising piece, are fundamental to give veracity to the advertisement. As such, they are more hidden, and readers do not always pick up certain intentional nuances of argumentative language. For this reason, countermeanings are implicit argumentative resources. Its position in the text, its effects of meaning and its degree of disguise are configured in strategy and, as a result, the advertiser ends up valuing only the ideology of concealment of the age, favorable to the rejuvenating cosmetic advertised.

The advertising speech builds its ads based on “truths” that support the need to purchase a product. The idea of youth, related to happiness, is conveyed as an indisputable truth and the following arguments are elaborated in order to enhance youthfulness and denigrate aging. The advertisement does not offer an opportunity for the reader/consumer to present other ideals, it does not allow different assessments, it simply imposes its ideology, consolidating an immutable belief. For Guimarães (2009, p. 62), “working in a logical way, the presupposition becomes difficult to be rejected and must be accepted by the speaker as well as by the interlocutor”. Based on this same consideration, Koch (1984, p. 59) states that “[...] the argumentative value of an enunciated would therefore be a kind of obligation regarding the way in which the discourse must be continued”. And, for Ducrot (1987, p. 30),

[The presupposition] [...] makes it possible to imprison the listener in an intellectual universe that he did not choose, but which is presented to him as coextensive to the dialogue itself. This universe can no longer be denied or questioned without that dialogue being rejected in its entirety. Now, if the presupposition, unlike the implicit, is not a fact of rhetoric linked to the enunciation, but is inscribed in the language itself, it is necessary to conclude that the language, regardless of the uses that can be made of it, presents itself, fundamentally, as the place of debate and confrontation of subjectivities.

Thus, if the advertisements defend the concealment of age and the readers/consumers accept their age, there is no exchange, and communication is meaningless. For this reason, the advertisement praises, in the most argumentative way possible, the attributes of youth, for the advertising to be configured in the acquisition of the product. The cosmetic will only be sold if the reader/consumer finds significant reasons for purchasing it. Based on Contani and Oliveira (2014, p. 109), “what makes meaning for some is contradictory for others, thus creating an alternation between meanings and countermeanings”. Faced with this type of advertisement, some elderly readers, in times of conflict with their chronological age, scarce of information from other discourses, such as gerontology, accept the values “taught” by the rejuvenating cosmetics advertisements and become loyal consumers of this type of cosmetic. Advertising takes advantage of the weaknesses and the lack of knowledge of individuals to enhance the miracles of their products.

According to Maingueneau (2001, p. 20), “every act of enunciation is fundamentally **asymmetrical**: the person who interprets the enunciated reconstructs its meaning from the indications present in the enunciated produced, but nothing guarantees that what it reconstructs coincides with the enunciator’s representations”. Thus, to assimilate an enunciated, we must mobilize very different knowledge, prioritizing an unstable data, the context. In the advertising discourse, this instability of the context does not act in a favorable way, as the enunciator wishes to maintain a single scenario, favorable to the product. So, in order to disseminate selected messages, the ad works, persuasively, with the implicit content. If the argument is effective, the context will be taken from the ad itself, not the individual; consequently, the reader/consumer assumes the enunciated to be true. For Maingueneau (2001, p. 20),

out of context, we cannot really speak of the meaning of an enunciated, but, at best, of constraints so that a meaning is attributed to the verbal sequence given in a particular situation, so that it becomes a true enunciated, assumed in a specific place and at a specific time, by a subject who, in a certain perspective, addresses one or more subjects.

Regarding argumentation and implicit, according to Guimarães (2009), the interconnection between semantics and pragmatics manifests itself not only on the surface of the text but also in its implicit ones, in the form of presuppositions or presumptions that, in communication, are represented as **linguistic** and referential strategies, also making silences understood (without emphasis in the original). Thus, “There is no denying the fact of the presence of the **implicit** in everything we say; every time we speak, a large part of the implicit is hidden in our speech – the language comprising a part of meaning left to interpretation” (GUIMARÃES, 2009, p. 61). In this way, there are always uncertainties about the communicational essence, in other words, meanings and countermeanings interfere with the clarity of the content of the messages.

According to Contani and Oliveira (2014), the enunciation characters use certain strategies, such as the implicit and the explicit, to establish the global meaning of the text, whose support is linked to three inseparable levels: pragmatic, semantic and syntactic. Thus, Semantic Argumentative considered a branch of Pragmatics, examines the relationship between speaker and addressee in a particular discourse situation, guiding the effects of the direction of messages through various procedures argumentation. The words are addressed to the addressee with certain values, inherent to the communicative situation, contributing to the final understanding of what was said. These elements that are indispensable to the persuasive effects of the enunciated are called linguistic marks of enunciation or argumentation.

Regarding the use of argumentative implicit, Maingueneau (1996, p. 95) explains:

Depending on whether they are placed at one or another level, the contents do not receive the same interpretative status at all. If the *posed* are presented as that to which the enunciated refers and therefore submitted to an eventual contestation, the *presuppositions* sideways remind elements whose existence is presented as obvious. This dissymmetry is crucial; it allows to focus attention on the posed and to 'pass' the presupposition discreetly. **Certainly, the presuppositions are not necessarily used for manipulative purposes, but it is undeniable that they offer this possibility** (without emphasis in the original).

Cabral (2011) states that the use of the implicit always plays a role in verbal interactions and, often, they are endowed with an argumentative force; “presumptions or presuppositions, they have an undeniable discursive role” (p. 62). Also, proving the argumentative use of the implicit, Koch (1984) points out that “the rhetorical use of the presupposition [...] is a second level rhetorical resource, that is, it is part of the applied rhetoric or pragmatics, constituting a highly effective argumentative maneuver” (p. 70). Thus, there is intentionality in selecting certain messages implicit in the production of texts. In every communication, a load of meaning underlies the intentionality and ideology of its author, which can be revealed, progressively, through clues signaled by the implicit contents, for example.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

We interweave the countermeaning to our theoretical foundation, based on the teachings of Argumentative Semantics, in the said and unsaid, in the posed, presupposition and presumption, in the meanings and countermeanings. Thus, we conclude that countermeaning is a semantic-argumentative phenomenon, acts as a linguistic strategy, transmits effects of meaning and can be considered implicit information, since it appears in a more veiled way in the persuasive language of a specific type of advertisement.

In our study, the ideological character of Gerontology and advertising allowed distinguishing meaning and countermeaning, which is not unique source for this training because the search field of the meanings and countermeanings is very vast. We emphasize that, if the reader/consumer is not motivated by an advertisement for rejuvenating cosmetics, this does not mean the absence of meanings in the text, but the meanings will be configured in another ideology, more conniving with the context of the individual.

Incompatible concepts can exist and are the result of choices and decisions. According to Oléron (1996), the realities of our social environment are the product of categorizations and judgments made about perceived data. There are many events that are not suitable for a totally dichotomous division, because they are situated in the continuum, in the transition. For example, a square circle is a figure that illustrates this incompatibility, because, if performed awkwardly by a child, it can integrate both geometric figures. These are not simple mind games, and scientific disciplines are not immune to this type of consideration, that is, this game of incompatibilities.

There will never be a lack of meanings, even if they are contrary to the idea initially transmitted. There will be exchanges of ideologies between different objects of study, however it is not up to us to determine the “true” and “most correct” ideological stance. Each area constructs its ideology according to its objectives, and the individual's psychological and social components will have their weight when coming into contact with certain values. For Oléron (1996), there is no life without ambivalence, without the coexistence of love and hate, fear and attraction, approach and withdrawal. Psychological and social life are marked by conflicts, which exist between groups, within individuals, because, according to the author,

Les intérêts et les déterminants qui conduisent à agir sont antagonistes chez l'escroc et sa victime, les combattants de chaque côté de la ligne de feu, les hommes politiques en compétition pour la conduite de l'État. Combien de nous n'aspirent-ils pas à la fois à gagner plus d'argent et à travailler moins, vivre des aventures originales et à bénéficier de la sécurité, à profiter des personnes et des choses sans en payer de prix? On dira facilement que ces intérêts et ces aspirations sont contradictoires et cependant leur coexistence est difficilement niable (OLÉRON, 1996, p. 57-58).¹

Thus, we reaffirm the idea that there is alternation and complementarity between meanings and countermeanings. Stances, even divergent, interact and complement each other, as they dialogue and are responsible for the argumentative architecture of the text. In addition, "It is also necessary to accept that the countermeaning receives its burden in dialogue and in the domain of oral and written codes, both located within the scope of the knowledge of language" (CONTANI; OLIVEIRA, 2014, p. 118). Finally, we emphasize the inclusion of the countermeaning in Argumentative Semantics, mobilizing contributions that the theory of Argumentation in Language and its development can provide for reading and writing, trying to sensitize the reader to explore the linguistic strategies represented by the implicit information.

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¹ The interests and determinants that drive action are antagonistic among bandits and victims, combatants on either side of the firing line, politicians competing for the conduct of the state. How many of us aspire to both earn more money and work less, to have original adventures and enjoy safety, to enjoy people and things without paying a price? It is easy to say that these interests and aspirations are contradictory and yet their coexistence is difficult to deny.

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